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A surety is bound with his principal as an original promissor, and his obligation
to pay is equally absolute ; he is held ordinarily to know every default of his
principal, and cannot protect h*mself by the mere indulgence of the creditor or
by the want of notice of the default of the principal, however much such indulgence or want of notice may, in fact, injure him.
The contract of a guarantor is his own separate contract. He is not bound to
do what the principal has contracted to do, like a surety, but only to answer for
the consequences of the default of the principal. He is not bound to take notice
of the non-performance of the original contract of the principal, and the creditor
should give him notice ; and if the guarantor can prove that he has suffered
damage by the failure to give such notice, he will be discharged to the extent of
the damage thus sustained. He cannot be sued with his principal. One contracting jointly with the principal debtor is, it seems, never deemed a guarantor.
Query as to the doctrine of notice in cases of guaranty.
A., B., and C. executed to a certain bank a joint and several bond in a penalty
of $15,000, with a condition reciting that A. had become a member of a certain
firm, rendering it probably necessary for him to use more funds in the business of
the firm than he would have at command, which he proposed to borrow ; and then
proceeding thus: "Now the foregoing bond is to be in force and binding upon us,
according to its terms, for the full amount -of any loans and advances the said
bank may make to said A. in connection with his said business, not to exceed in
amount $15,000, for which sums by the foregoing bond we acknowledge ourselves
his sureties ; and in case of his failure to pay any such loans and advances as
aforesaid, that the same shall and may be collected off of us. Unless such loans
and advances are made to said A. in his business aforesaid, upon the faith of this
bond, the same is null and void," &c
Held, that this was not a mere overture, or proposition, by B. and C. to guaranty, but was an actual undertaking.
Held, also, that the instrument was not a guaranty, in any strictly legal sense,
but that B. and C. were sureties.
Hld, also, that notice to the sureties of loans made on the credit of the bond
and of the default of the principal debtor, was not necessary, in order to fix the
liability of the sureties.
Held, also, that the fact that the loans made were not given solely on the credit
of the bond, did not affect the question of liability.
Held, also, that all the obligors might be sued on the bond together.
APPEAL

from the Rush Circuit Court.

This was a suit by the Bull's Head Bank against James T. and
Samuel E. McMillan and James Goddard, upon a joint and several bond executed by them in a penalty of fifteen thousand dollars,
with a condition reciting that James T. McMillan had become a
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member of a certain firm in New York, rendering it probably
necessary for him to use more funds in the business of the firm
than he would have at command, and which he proposed to borrow; and then proceeding thus: "Now the foregoing bond is to
be in force and binding upon us, according to its terms, for the
full amount of any loans and advances the said bank may make
to said James T. MeMillan in connection with his said business,
.not to exceed in amount fifteen thousand dollars, for which
sums by the foregoing bond we acknowledge ourselves his sureties, and in case of his failure to pay any such loans or advances
as aforesaid, that-the same shall and may be collected off of us.
* * Unless such loans and advances are made -to said McMillan
in his business aforesaid, upon the faith of this bond, the same
is null and void. In witness," &c. It was averred by the cgnplaint that the plaintiff, on the faith of the bond, for the accommodation of James T. McMillan in the business aforesaid, loaned
to him certain sums, viz., eight hundred and forty dollars on the
check of one Miller on another bank, endorsed by McMillan, and
seven hundred and seventy-five dollars on a similar check of
one Meyer, endorsed, &c. ; that said checks were duly presented
for payment, which was refused, and thereupon protested, &c.;
and that both checks remain unpaid, &c. Copies of the bond
and checks were made exhibits. There was also a paragraph for
money loaned and money paid.
It was assigned for error that the court below erred in overruling a demurrer by the sureties to the first paragraph of the
complaint.
H. M. Bay, B. F. Claypoole, and B. L. iSmit i, for appellants.
L. & W. Sexton, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delfvered by
FRAZER, C. J.-The argument is, that the bond shows a mere
overture to guaranty by the sureties, which at most would only
create a secondar.y.and collateral liability; and that there should
have been an averment of notice of the loans made on the credit
of the bond, and of the default of the principal debtor.
It was not an overture, or proposition, to guaranty, but an
actual undertaking. The distinction will be readily seen by an
examination of the cases of Stafford v. Low, 16 Johns. 67, and

Beekman v. H1ale, 17 Id. 134.
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There is considerable loose writing in the text-books upon the
subjects of guaranty and suretyship. Sometimes the two things
are confounded throughout, and the terms used interchangeably,
as signifying the same thing. This has introduced some confusion in the cases, so that there are dicta, and even decisions, to
the effect that to fix the liability of a guarantor, notice of default
of the principal debtor is required, much as in the case of an
endorser of strictly commercial paper. Smith v. Bainbridge, 6
Blackf. 12, is a case of this character. It was decided on the
authority of Douglass v. Reytnolds, 7 Pet. 113, and was followed'
in Virden v. .Ellsworth, 15 Ind. 144. Harris v. Pierce, 6 Id.
162, is not quite in harmony with those rulings, however. This
doctrine has never been applied, that we are aware of, only in
q~ses of letters of credit and the guaranty of commercial paper,
except in Vrirden v. Ellsworth; and its soundness has been utterly
denied even in that class of cases, in New York and Massachusetts: Oxford Bank v. Haynes, 8 Pick. 423; Douglass v. H1owland, 24 Wend. 35; Smith v. Dann, 6 Hill 543. It is certain
that the Supreme Court of the United States found it impossible
to stand upon the broad principle which they had laid down in
Douglass v. Reynolds,supra; for when the same case came before
that court again, a very important modification of the former
ruling as to notice of default was made: .Reynolds v. Douglass,
12 Pet. 497. See also 2 Am. L. Cas. 124. It is possible that
the subject should receive a more thorough consideration than it
has heretofore received in this court, before the questions alluded
to can be deemed closed against further discussion in this state.
The view which we take of the bond sued on in the case before
us renders it unnecessary to enter upon that investigation at present; and what has been said concerning the matter is not
intended to commit the court upon it.
We are not of the opinion that the instrument sued on is a
guaranty in any strictly legal sense. A guaranty differs in
some important respects from suretyship, and it is not easy to
define it by any brief and comprehensive formula. Mr. Parsons
says: "We cannot, therefore, define a guarantor of a bill or
note any better than by saying that he is one who engages that
the note shall be paid, but is not an endorser nor a surety :" 2
Pars. on Notes and Bills 117. And yet the same author, in his
excellent work on Contracts, ch. 7, uses the terms guaranty
VOL. XIX.-28
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and suretyship as being of the same import. So also does Mr.
Chitty in his work on Contracts: Chit. on Cont. 546. The contract of a surety corresponds with that of a guarantor in many
respects, but important differences exist. The surety is bound
with his principal as an original promissor-he is a debtor from
the beginning, and must see that the debt is paid, and is held
ordinarily to know every default of his principal, and cannot
protect himself by the mere indulgence of the creditor, nor by
want of notice of the default of the principal, however such
indulgence or want of notice may in fact injure him. Being
bound with the principal, his obligation to pay is equally absolute. On the other hand, the contract of a guarantor is his own
separate contract; it is in the nature of a warranty by him that
the thing guaranteed, to be done by the principal, shall be dose
-not merely an engagement jointly with the principal to do the
thing. A guarantor, not being a joint contractor with his principal, is not bound to do what the principal has contracted to do,
like a surety, but only to answer for the consequences of the
default of the principal. The original contract of the principal
is not his contract, and he is not bound to take notice of its nonperformance-and therefore the creditor should give him notice;
and it is universally held that if the guarantor can prove that he
has suffered damage by the failure to give such notice, he will be
discharged to the extent of the damage thus sustained. It is
not so with a surety.
In the present case, the contract is joint and several, and the
principal debtor is a party to it. The others are described in it
as sureties and expressly contract to answer as sureties. All
may, of course, be sued together. But a guarantor cannot be
sued with his principal; for his engagement is not jointly with the
latter, but is strictly an individual contract. There is no case in
the books, to our knowledge, and some pains have been bestowed
in their examination, in which one contracting jointly with ihe
principal debtor has been deemed a guarantor and allowed to
avail himself of such defences as are peculiar to that character.
The bond does not purport to be a contract collateral to some
other engagement of the principal debtor. Its terms did not require that the contemplated loans should be made upon any other
or additional security. It authorized loans to be made upon any
terms that might be agreed to by the principal and the bank; and
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*the obligation of the sureties was to pay them at maturity, if the
principal did not. It differed in no essential respect from any
ordinary bond of a principal and sureties, conditioned to answer
for a default of the principal. In such cases, surely neither
notice of acceptance nor notice of default is necessary to fix the
liability of the sureties. We are of opinion that the complaint
was good, and the demurrer to it properly overruled.
Upon trial of the issue made by an answer of general denial,
the evidence showed that the loans were not made solely upon
the credit of the bond. We do not think that this affected the
question of liability.
Judgment affirmed, with four per cent. damages and costs.
,It is probable that no principles of
commercial law have been more exhaustively discussed, and certainly none
have been the result of a wider divergence of opinion and process, than those
announced in the foregoing case: and
inasmuch as the judgment of the court
was reached through considerable difficulty, a brief examination of the questions involved may be of some service.
That the instrument to be considered
was a bond, did not affect, although it
may have simplified, the application of
rules to be here touched upon; and
while the fact that no aid from extrinsic
circumstance was required, to ascertain
the scope of the engagement, may be
deemed fortunate, as insuring an additional degree of ease in that application,
it is certain that, had the case been
otherwise, such aid could have been
legitimately invoked. If in these two
respects, therefore, the subject had been
differently presented, the same principles
of the law of surety would have operated, notwithstanding that certainly
more labor, and possibly another result,
would have been necessary. As the
matter stood there was less to be overcome than in an ordinary contest growing out of a parol contract, whereof the
primary intention must be gathered from
the circumstances of the parties; and,
there being but the bond and the words

in their ordinary signification to examine, a fair opportunity was presented
for the establishment of a leading state
precedent.
The confusion produced by text
writers in the mind even of a careful
reader upon the subject of the two degrees of suretyship, one of which they
generally call by the term which may
signify both, and the other by the unsatisfactory, and possibly indefensible,
name of guaranty, is the result of a
want of care, in apprehending a distinction which itself is clearly drawn,
and in the use of words indifferently
even after their independent significance
is settled. It would be far better if the
more comprehensive contract was called
" original," and that of the secondary
class "collateral ;" for the denominations in vogue have, between themselves,'
no absolutely distinctive sense, and are
constantly used interchangeably. Every
guaranty is a contract of suretyship,
simply because it is an engagement to
answer in some way for another; but
it is a contract of suretyship of a peculiar nature, carrying with it certain incidents as the result of the characteristics
which limit its scope, and so make it to
differ in effect from engagements of the
same class having no qualification attending them. These last are, technically, the only contracts of suretyship.
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And if the names are used technically,
their individual force should be ascertained, and the difference in degree
should be carefully borne in mind.
And the facts, that many writers do not
use them distinctively, and that the
majority at times avail themselves of an
alleged difference, and at others disregard it, have certainly produced complications which are almost irreconcilable.
To these avoidable difficulties are
added the sure and very serious labors
of a just construction of language used
carelessly by the contracting parties
themselves, and which must be interpreted often by the light of the circumstances of the arrangement, as to which
the testimony is generally conflicting,
so that issues of fact are not rarely a
prerequisite to the construction of words
which standing alone are ambiguous.
The intention of the parties must govern
absolutely, as far as their design is not
against law; and if it is ascertained
that, in becoming surety for another, A.
bound himself primarily to B., or that,
on the contrary, he merely engaged to
be secondarily liable, his must be called
an original, or collateral, undertaking
irrespective of any name he may himself give it. Thus in the principal case
the result, independently of what it
actually was, must necessarily have
been the same had the bondsmen written
in the clause of condition, "we acknowledge ourselves his guarantors,"
instead of, "we acknowledge ourselves
his sureties;" as it did not depend upon
the language employed, but upon the
animus which inspired that language.
When, by the latter guide, the former
*is apt, we have an instance of accuracy
which excludes difficulty. Thus, apart
from the other aspect of a case which
is not here referred to as an authority,
we can well understand how in Oldham
v. Allen (cited 2 Cr. & M. 433), referred
to by BA aT,

J., the assurance "I

will see you paid," was held to establish
in one and the same transaction an
original indebtedness in the speaker
relatively to a credit sought on behalf
of A. and B., and a merely collateral,
or contingent, liability relatively to a
credit given C. and D., just as in Keate
v. Temple, 1 Bos. & Full. 158; Matson
v. Wharamn, 2 T. R. 80, and Mountstephens v. Lakeman, L. R. 5 Q. B. 613,
the identical words expressed a contract
of secondary-whilst in Birk-myr v. Darnell, Salk. 27 a, they were declared to
import one of a primary-liability.
It is true that frequently the terms
employed are an index to the intent;
and it sometimes happens that no other
guide whatever can be had, in which
event the ordinary force and meaning of
the language, as usually taken, must
rule the decision. But one cause of the
errors already hinted at as productive
of the confusion complained of by the
court in the principal case, lies in this,
that in some instances too much reliance
has been placed upon a guide not always sufficient. An undue stress has
been laid upon the name, and so withdrawn a degree of credit due to the
spirit, of the contract; and a promise
has been called collateral or contingent,
because it was intended as a guaranty,
rather than a guaranty because it was
meant that the obligation should not be
direct and absolute; and although this
may appear but a fault in words, it has,
by constant recurrence in certain quarters, not the less conferred a special
significance upon a name, which is only
to be sought in the minds of the parties.
To repeat-if by the agreement one man
is shown to be directly liable to another,
the liability cannot be limited because
he is described as a guarantor ; for the
reason that, no matter what name is
employed, the responsibility, as above
noted, is fixed by something entirely
independent thereof.
It is of importance, therefore, that an
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adequately comprehensive rule should
be established in the premises; whilst,
perhaps, it is equally obvious that an
attempt to supply any such need could
not be made in this note. The difficulties, as well as serious dangers, of a
course of criticism which, to lead to a
definite result, must oppose and disregard much that even learned jurists,
whilst hinting emphatic disapproval,
have not yet officially pronounced
against, are to be readily understood.
But it may be safe to observe that contracts of the class discussed might be
called contracts of suretyship indifferently; and that the main object should
be to ascertain whether, no matter how
described, the engagements are secondary
or primary; whether, by virtue of the
promises considered, the burden of the
performance falls upon the promissor, or
he merely stipulates that, as it falls upon
others, the promissee shall be protected
by him in the event of their default.
In law there exists the, not only logical,
but also very just, distinction between
these compacts, which the plaintiffs in
error in the principal case urged in their
own behalf; the former operating to
place the sureties on the footing of principals, cut aloof from, or at all events
without, as against a creditor, privilege
or defence independently of, that other
whose liability they have made their
own; and the latter securing them protection from any consequences of their
act until a default, to which the promissee has in no way contributed, is
established. Out of this natural difference have grown the doctrines of notice,
the aid of which, in view of their line
of defence, the plaintiffs in error were
-obliged to invoke; but which do not,
considering the actual decision of the
court, appear to have been necessary to
the adjudication. In law also, the very
distinction thus noted (independently
of the Statute of Frauds) precludes the
recognition of any distinction between

the debtor and the man who, in order
perhaps to gain, and certainly to more
fully secure the repayment of, a valuable
obligation, has assumed the debt with
him; and he therefore is at once, and
as fully, liable as if he alone was the
obligor. Thus in the case discussed
the court held the contract to be one of
a direct liability on a certain contingency, and therefore resolving as they
did, their theory must have been that
the stipulation became absolutely binding upon the sureties as principals at
the execution of the bond, and upon the
happening of the event immediately operative against all three as direct promissors
for a valuable consideration ; that until
a breach it was no more binding upon
James T. McMillan than upon his
sponsors, and after a breach it was no
less binding upon them than upon him.
But this cannot be the conclusion when
the surety has contracted to be secondarily liable, or liable over after his
principal's default. Whereas, in equity
each degree of liability, the primary or
the secondary, is held to be subsidiary
to that of the party who derives material benefit from the bargain. And' it
may be worth while to note the further
distinction produced by the Statute of
Frauds, to meet the requirements of
which the contract of a surety is so far
collateral as to be incapable of proof
save by a minute in writing; unless it
is demonstrated that he was so absolutely and unqualifiedly a principal, that
the credit which was given him was
extended to no one else. Thus, practically, the principle of classification,
above noted, is not alone inartificial,
but it is neither harsh nor inconvenient.
The objection, that a surety is held independently of any question of consideration, falls without discussion.
It is plain that if a contract is made,
and is simply directly binding between
the parties, there is little danger of
serious difficulties in the way of an ad-
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justmeat at law of the rights of all :
whilst it must follow that the complications which do arise are mainly the offspring of collateral engagements. As
these are usually called guaranties, the
law of guaranty is not free from difficulty even after the probable looseness
of writers, and the certain labors of
construction, to which we have already
adverted, are overcome; and if it has
been determined that a promise is in the
nature of a warranty, Much nevertheless
remains still to be settled before even an
action against the warrantor can be sustained.
1o limit, of course, can be put to his
right to contract upon whatever legal
terms he chooses, and he cannot be
held answerable upon any other than
those to which he has agreed. Generally
if he has guarantied the goodness of a
debt, or its susceptibility of collection,
it must be proved that the debt was not
good, or that the collection, after reasonable diligence, was impossible, before
he himself may be successfully attacked.
Insolvency of the debtor at the maturity
of the obligation is enough to sustain
an averment that the latter is bad; as
insolvency resulting from or developed
by legal proceedings to recover, which
produce nothing else, sufficiently demonstrates that what was sought was not
collectable. In a word, as something
precedent is absolutely essential to the
availability of the subsidiary security,
in an effort to profit by the latter it
must be clearly shown that the prescribed
something, whether in the nature of an
act, or of a condition of things, has
been fully pre-accomplished; and the
law has sustained the principle, whilst
avoiding some of the difficulties, of the
doctrine, by pronouncing certain facts
sufficient as proofs for this purpose.
In the principal case, then, as the
obligors were held to be directly contracting parties, the judgment necessarily followed ; whereas, had they been

found to be only secondarily liable, the
judgment might still have been against
them, and would have depended upon
the settlement of other issues, perhaps
awaiting the fate of the demurrer. Applying the test which seems correct, we
ask, did Samuel McMillan and James
Goddard promise that, in consideration
of the advances to be made to James
McMillan, they assumed the burden of
his obligation? Or did they merely
warrant that McMillan was solvent, and
that, by himself, his loans would be
returned? Did they'stipulate to perform
personally, or only that he would perform
?
Certainly
the difference between a
promise to do an act, and an assurance
that another will do it, seems simple
enough, even although it is an element
of the latter promise that he who makes
it will answer if his warranty fails.
But what may be clearly seen in words is
not so readily deducible from facts. The
principal case presents difficulties. The
parties "acknowledged" themselves to
whilst, however, the
be "sureties,"
loans to their principal were "to be
collected off of" them-" in case of his
failure to pay."
In Laymondv. Gent, I Rolle's Abr. 14,
pl. 2, and Turner v. Philips,Id. 20, pl.
14, et vide I Ventr. 293, the phrase
41If another does not pay, I will," evidenced a collateral undertaking; and
assuming it proper to rely upon the
words as fitted to the intent, it might
be urged with some plausibility, that a
responsibility to pay if another does
not, scarcely differs from a responsibility
as sureties to pay upon a failure ; the use
of the word " sureties," as has been
seen, not of itself deciding the character
of the contract, no matter what bearing
it may have upon it. Moreover, since
an action of assumpsit is the proper
remedy upon a breach of the so-called
warranty, there is no guide afforded by
the process to which the creditor must
resort; inasmuch as that action is as
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well his means of recovery upon a
direct undertaking; and he accordingly
may sue in one way upon either engagement. The damages recovered, too,
whatever the form of demand, should
in no event be more or less than the
value of the credit legally given ; and
it would therefore seem to follow that,
in every partictlar, the consequences of
a promise "I warrant you he will pay,"
would be the same as of another, "If
he does not pay you, I will ;" and, "If
he does not pay you, I will," would
appear to be, "I will pay you in case
of his failure." So that by this view the
plaintiffs in error simply warranted their
principal's performance.
But it may be questioned whether,
after all, such a conclusion would be
justified upon an examination of the
pleadings, since the averments admitted
by the demtrrer might have the effect
of dissipating the assumed force of the
provision for a "failure" to pay, and
of showing the word "sureties" in the
technical light of the opinion of the
court. Of course the fact that the agreement was in writing did not prove it
collateral in the sense now pertinent, as
may be inferred from the observations
already made; and the parties, doubtless,
never once thought of the Statute of
Frauds. But the existence of a joint
and several bond, upon the faith of
which, by the sureties' own declaration,
the advances were to be made, was evidence of a credit at once given to, and
of a responsibility accepted by, all the
parties; and it would seem to have involved some ill motive in the demurrants
if, by their objections, they sought judgment upon the ground, that although
they contracted for accommodations to
their friend in consideration of their
being bound by deed for his performance, they did not mean to assume the
burden of his obligation. And moreover the contingency of a failure to pay,
without mention of which the bond

could have had but one construction,
may have been indicated to signify the
time when a liability, already assumed,
could be proceeded upon by the creditor;
and not as fixing a date anterior to
which they were to be held as outside
of the arrangement, and subsequently
to which they were to answer over only
after the loans were proved to be not
collectable from him who had used them.
And as far as the bank was concerned,
it can reasonably be considered certain
that such, and such only, was the view
of its officers, whose character as business men, and position as trustees,
would exclude any presumption of a
contract less safe and convenient than
it might have been. In fine, the bond,
relatively to the demurrants, presents
but an ambiguity, which only by a strained interpretation, sure to oppose the
practical convictions of those whose
custom it is to use such papers, could
have been resolved in their favor; and
the plaintiffs merited a recovery.
Notice to one that his offer is accepted
is of course necessary to the completion
of a contract, simply because otherwise
there is no meeting of minds, without
the assumption of which the very idea
of a compact is incomplete. The acceptance operates to fix a responsibility
which that one has previously suggested,
but, by the very nature of the thing, not
assumed. So, also, pending the existence of a contract thus consummated
by offer and acceptance, if it be continuous in its nature, and contemplate
independent acts at future times, notice
of an acceptance may be essential in
any instance when a liability for those
acts, though already possibly tacitly
countenanced, has certainly not been
provided for on both sides, by the understanding that a renewal of the obligation is tendered and taken. And finally,
notice of a breach is necessary to one
who has pledged himself to answer in
the event of a breach. Thus, in some
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of the cases a guarantor has been held
entitled to three kinds of notice :-that
his proposal to endorse is accepted;
that at intervals new loans have been
negotiated with the principal, on the
faith of his original endorsement; and
that a demand has been made upon the
principal, and he has failed to pay. But
the doctrine thus concisely referred to
in passing, is subject to limitation; and
here, as elsewhere, notice is fonud to
be actual or constructive, due or not

Supreme

due, according to the circumstances of
the parties. And when a primary and
subsisting liability is directly incurred
between the principals in a bargain,
there is obviously no room for any defence based upon a want of notice that
the immediate or consequent obligations
are accepted. So that, it being admitted
that the minds have met, a subject of a
good deal of intricacy, and of only
special interest, is avoided.
W. W. WLTnA&NE.

Court of Missouri.

JAMES HUNTER v. JEFF. CHANDLER.
The judgment on a po warranto, at the suit of the Attorney-General acting for
the state, settles the title as between the state and the defendant, but does not fix
the rights of another person claiming to be the rightful officer.
If proceedings on such quo warranto are commenced during the incumbency of
defendant, his subsequent death or resignation, or the expiration of the term of
office, will not prevent the information from being prosecuted to judgment.
Title to an office is derived from election or appointment. A commission is
merely evidence of title.
An action for money had and received will lie in favor of a person legally entitied or in possession of an office, against one who has usurped or intruded into it,
for the recovery of the fees received by the intruder; but where a party claiming
the title has not been in actual possession, and his claim is disputed, he must first
establish his title by some appropriate legal proceeding. The title to an office
cannot be determined in an action for fees.

THIS was an action for money had and received. The plaintiff
stated in his petition that during the most of the year 1865, and
also in the year 1866 up to the 1st of April, he was city attorney
for the city of St. Joseph, duly elected and qualified, so as to be
entitled to the accustomed fees and emoluments of the office for
the whole time mentioned. That about the 1st day of April
1866 the defendant, without plaintiff's leave or authority, usurped
and intruded himself into said office, and from the time last mentioned until about the last of March 1867 defendant continued

to usurp and intrude himself into said office, during all of which
time he received the accustomed fees and emoluments thereof to
and for the use of the plaintiff. That plaintiff was the only
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lawful city attorney during the time last before mentioned, and
the only person entitled to discharge the duties and receive the
emoluments of the office.
It further averred that, at the March Term, 1867, of this
court, the attorney-general of the state exhibited an information
in the nature of a quo warranto in the name of the state, and
upon his own relation, charging the defendant with usurping and
intruding into the said office, and asking that he be ousted therefrom. That thereupon the defendant, in order to avoid a judgment of ouster, did immediately vacate the office and resign all
right to the same; and that when the case came on to be heard,
defendant disclaimed that he was holding said office or was in
possession thereof, and presented his resignation duly approved
by the mayor of St. Joseph, and that in consequence of said
resignation the attorney-general took no further steps with the
case.
The petition then alleged that the defendant, whilst so exercising the duties of the office, received fees and emoluments
accruing therefrom to the amount of $3000, and judgment was
asked for that sum.
This petition was demurred to, and the demurrer sustained by
the court below.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WAGNER, C. J.-Whether defendant resigned and vacated the
office to avoid a judgment of ouster at the instance of the state,
is not material as respects the rights of the'plaintiff. The information was by the attorney-general on behalf of the state to
protect'the public against usurpation and intrusion, and in such
a proceeding the private rights of a third party claiming the
office are not determined or passed upon. The state, acting
through its law-officer, does not establish the- rights of private
persons to an office; it only maintains its own dignity and protects the public interest by ousting those who usurp or intrude
into offices and unlawfully exercise their franchises. Where a
private person wishes to have his right to an office adjudicated,
the statute points out the course to pursue. It provides that the
information shall be prosecuted at his relation, and shall be proceeded upon in such manner as is usual in cases of information
in the nature of a quo warranto: 2 Wagner's Statutes 1183,
sect. 2.
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As the proceedings generally raise questions of fact, and the
parties have an ample remedy in the Circuit Court, and this court
being chiefly an appellate tribunal, it will refuse, except under
peculiar circumstances, to allow any information to be filed to
inquire into the title of a private person to an office: State v.
Mellhaney, 32 Mo. 379; State v. Lawrence, 38 Id. 535; State
v. Buskirk, 43 Id. 111.
Had the attorney-general proceeded with the information filed
by him to a final determination, the judgment would have fixed
the rights of the defendant to the office, but not those of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff was no party to the record. The information was not at his relation, and his title could not have been
passed upon. But the resignation of the incumbent, or even the
termination of the office, would not prevent the information being
prosecuted to a final judgment, if the proceedings were commenced prior to the resignation or the expiration of the term:
Cor. v. Smith, 45 Penn. St. 59 ; People v. HTartwell, 12 Mich.
508.
The law will not permit the ends of justice to be defeated at
the mere volition of a party who seeks to elude its judgments by
changing his condition for his own advantage. I think, therefore, that an information in the nature of a quo warranto to try
the right to a public office may be tried after the term has expired, or the officer holding it has resigned, if the information
was filed or the proceeding begun before the resignation took
place or the term expired.
The question has been mooted whether an action of this character was maintainable. About this I have no doubt. The authorities abundantly establish the principle that an action for
money had and received will lie in favor of a person really entitled
to an office, against one who has usurped and intruded into the
same, for the recovery of the known and fixed fees that such
intruder may have received: Glascocek v. Lyon8, 20 Ind. 1; Powell v. Millbank, 1 T. R. 399, n.; Boyter v. Dodsworth, 6 Id. 481;
Saddler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1984; Lightly v. Olonston, 1 Taunt.
113; Allen v. MeKean, 1 Sumn. 117; 1 Selw. N. P. 81; 1
Chitty's P1. 112.
The doctrine which underlies these cases, and upon which the
rule rests, is, that if one man receives money which ought to be
paid to another, or belongs to him, this action for money had and
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received will lie in favor of the party to whom of right the money
belongs.
In Allen v. M_'cKean, supra, Judge STORY held that there was
no difficulty in maintaining the suit, simply because it involved a
trial to the office, if the party had once been in possession. In
that case Allen the plaintiff was, and for some time previous to
the commencement of the suit had been, President of Bowdoin
College, and he had been illegally superseded as such president.
He prosecuted the action to recover certain fees due him as such
officer, and the judgment of the court was that he was entitled to
recover. But there he was incumbent and had been unlawfully
ousted. In the present case it is not shown that the plaintiff was
in the actual possession at the time the usurpation and intrusion
complained of took place. There is no direct or express allegation that the plaintiff was inducted into the office at the time.
But there is an averment that the defendant was in under a commission, for it is stated he resigned the same with the approval
of the mayor. This shows that a contest, or some kind of litigation, was necessary to determine to whom the office really belonged. It has been often decided by this court that the officer
derives his right to the office from his election or appointment,
and that the commission is simply evidence of his title. Where
he has been fairly and legally elected his right at once becomes
absolute, and if another person by unjust, false, or fraudulent
means gets possession of the office, exercises its duties and enjoys
its franchises, he will be responsible to the rightful occupant for
all the accustomed fees and emoluments when the right is finally
established.
This brings us to the next question, namely: whether the title
to the office can be determined in an action of this kind when
the party claiming sues for the fees, or whether he must first
establish his right by some appropriate legal proceeding. Where
the party had once been in possession and he was unlawfully
ousted by an intruder, there might be no difficulty in applying
the rule laid down by Justice STORY in Allen v. JfcKean. But
where such was not the fact, and the title was in doubt, such a
principle would be productive of the greatest confusion, and
would lead to endless and unnecessary litigation. I am aware
that there are very respectable authorities holding that the title
to an office may be determined in a suit for fees. The old Eng-
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lish cases strongly sustain this view; but I think that the better
doctrine and reason is to the contrary.
In the case of The State to wse of Bradshaw v. Sherwood et al.,
42 Mo. 179, we decided that an action would not lie to recover
damages for being deprived of an office when the plaintiff did
not claim the office and another person was in Ipossession. That
it was necessary for thp plaintiff first to establish his right in a
proceeding for that purpose in order to show that he was damnifled. With that decision we are satisfied, and see no good reason
for departing from it. The right or title to an office ought not
to be determined in a civil action of this kind. The party should
not be permitted to sleep on his rights and let another person
perform services, and then claim the compensation which was the
result of the labor performed. When the defendant obtained
possession of the office, the plaintiff should have either proceeded
to contest his right or resorted to his quo warranto, and upon
judgment rendered in his favor he then might have maintained
his action for the recovery of the fees and emoluments of which
he had been unjustly deprived. But, as no steps were taken to
establish his title, and it has not even yet been established, I think
the judgment of the lower court was right, and should be
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
In addition to the point decided in the
above case, concerning the right of an
officer to recover the fees of office from
one who illegally usurps the same;
there is another closely connected therewith of hardly less importance, and
which at times has excited considerable
comment. That is, the force and effect
of the acts of an officer de facto, as distinguished from those of one de jure.
It was held at a very early day that in
the case of sovereign powers, the necessities of mankind demanded that the
acts of a government de facto, should
be held valid and binding, as otherwise
there would be no security for life,
liberty, or property, in times of civil
commotion or rebellion. This doctrine
found expression in the form of a
statute, as long ago as the reign of Ed-

ward IV. of England; in Statute I
Edward IV., c. 6 the three former
kings, Henry IV., V. and VI., being
styled "late kings of England in dede
and not of ryght," and subsequent
statutes excused obedience to a king de
facto, whose acts for the time being are
expressly recognised as valid. It may
therefore be safely asserted that whenever a power or a government is able
to maintain itself in authority, it is
necessary for the peace and development
of society that such government or
power should be recognised pro tempore
as the legal power, and full effect and
validity given to all acts under it.
This fundamental rule, or maxim as
it may be called, was soon applied to the
case of officers of inferior authority ;
and the acts of an officer de facto, held
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as good, valid, and binding, as those of only qualification of the foregoing cases
one de jure. In Knight v. Wells, Lutw. being that such officer de facto exercises
508, the act of a mayor de facto, was the duties of his office under color of an
held good, though he was not lawfully appointment or election, and not as a
mayor. And so the admission of a mere usurper who undertakes the office
steward to copyhold lands was approved, without color of right: Plymouth v.
though the steward had no authority, on Painter, supra. There is no better
the ground that he was an officer de definition of an officer de facto than
facto: Harrisv.Jays,Cro. Eliz. 699; see that laid down by Lord ELLENBOROUGH,
also O'Brienv. Kerivan, Cro. Jac. 552. in the case of The King v. The CorporaModern cases have fully confirmed the tion of Bedford Level, 6 East 368. "An
same doctrine: Scalding v. Lorant, 66 officer de facto," he says, "is one who
E. C. L. 686. In this country the rule has the reputation of being the officer
is well established, that all acts of an he assumes to be, and yet is not a good
officer de facto, are valid as far as re- officer in point of law." And as to
gards third parties. Judge KE T, in what constitutes such an officer, was
Mclnstrey v. Tanner, 9 Johns. 135, say- ably defined by SUTHERLAND, J,, in
ing the acts of officers de facto are Wilcox v. Smith, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 231,
often valid as far as they concern the where he says, "1that an individual comrights of third parties : The People v. ing into office by color of an election or
Cook, 4 Seld. (N. Y. Ct. Appeals) 85. appointment is an officer de facto, and
In Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. his acts in relation to third parties are
Fowler, 10 Mass, 301, P.AsoNs, C. J., valid until he is removed, although it is
says, "so long as officers are such de conceded that his election or appointfacto under an appointment, their offi- ment was illegal. The mere claim to
cial acts are valid." Coolidge v. Brig- be a public officer, and the performance
ham, I Allen 335. In Pennsylvania it of a single or even a number of acts in
was held in Cornishv. Young, 1 Ash. 153, that character, will not constitute an inthat the judicial acts of an alderman dividual an officer de facto. There
de facto, possessing a commission legal must be some color of an election or
on its face, can only be inquired into in appointment or an exercise of the office,
a suit where he is a party, and in Riddle and an acquiescence on the part of the
v. Bedford, 7 S. & R. 392, DUNCAN, J., public for a length of time, which
says, "there are many acts done by an affords a strong presumption of at least
officer de facto which are valid. They a colorable election or appointment."
are good as to strangers and all those This seems to be a true and accurate
persons who are not bound to look fur- definition, and was followed in The
ther than that the person is in the actual People v. Tinan, 8 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
exercise of the office, without investigat- 359, where ALLEN, J., says, "a mere
ing his title." See also to the same ef- claim to be a public officer is not suffifect MfcKim v. Somers, 1 Penna. 297 ; cient, there must be a colorable right to
Keyser v. McKissan, 2 Rawle 139 ; Com. the office." See also to the same effect
v. Slifer, I Casey 23; City of Philadel- the case of Plymouth v. Painter, 17
phia v. Given, 60 Penna. 136; Burke v. Conn. 585, cited above, and The State
Elliott, 4 Iredell 355 (N. C.) ; Plymouth v. Brennan'sLiquors, 25 Conn. 278. A
v. Painter,17 Conn. 586; St. Louis Co. like rule is laid down in Pritchett v.
Courtv. Sparks, 10 Missouri 117 ; State People, 1 Gilm. 525, the judge relying
v. Perkins, 4 Zabriskie 409 (N. J.); on the ease of Wilcox v. Smith, as conPritchett v. People, I Gilm. 525. The taining the true principle of what con-
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stitutes an officer de fado. From the
foregoing synopsis it will appear to be
almost indisputably established that the
acts of an officer de facto are valid and
binding as regards third persons, unless
where they enure to his own advantage,
and that it is only necessary to constitute such an officer, that he should have
some colorable title to the office he
exercises, and not be a mere usurper.
As regards the principal point in the
foregoing case of Hunter v. Chandler,
on the right of the officer who is legally
elected to an office, to recover the fees
of such office from the party who was
illegally in possession, the authorities
are less numerous and scarcely as satisfactory.
Iii Boyter v. Dodsworth, reported in
6 Term Rep. 681, Lord KENYON says,
" where there are regular fees due for
duties performed in an office, and one
should intrudeinto such office, the rightful incumbent may maintain an action
for money had and received, against
such intruder, to recover the fees." And
such is the ruling in the principal case
of Hunter v. Chandler, where the point
is fairly met and determined; WAGNER,
C. J., who delivered the opinion of the
court, saying, "1as to the question
whether an action can be maintained by
an officer for the fees of his office,
against a usurper, I have no doubt
the rule rests upon the principle, that if
one man receives money which ought to
be paid to another, the latter may maintain an action for it."
There the party against whom the
action was brought was an intruder,
apparently without any claim of title;
and the general doctrine was laid down,
that the right to an office being derived
from election or appointment, if after
such election or appointment another
unlawfully usurps or intrudes into such
office, he is responsible to the rightful
claimant for all the accustomed fees
received by himl and this was only so

far qualified, that it was held necessary
for the rightful claimant to first establish
his right by legal proceedings.
It may readily be admitted, that
where, as in the foregoing case, the
occupant is plainly an intruder or
usurper, he should be responsible to the
lawful claimant for the fees received
while unlawfully in possession. But
the case is somewhat different, and the
rule may be unnecessarily severe if
applied to a candidate, apparently
legally elected to an offie, the duties
of which he is performing conscientiously and ably, should it afterwards
be found that his election was the result
of a fraudulent vote, of which he was
totally ignorant.
On the one hand it may be said, that
the emoluments of office only belong to
him who is ultimately decided to have
been legally elected, while on the other
it may be justly urged that the office
must be filled lest the public suffer, and
as no one but he who is apparently
elected, can discharge the duties, he is
entitled to compensation for the time he
is in office.
The point did not arise, and therefore
was not decided in Hunter v. Chandler,
for there great stress was laid on the
fact that the party in possession was an
unlawful intruder and usurper, so that
the case is no authority for the doctrine
that the fees always belong to the party
ultimately entitled to the office.
In Douglassv. The State exrel. Wright,
recently decided in Indiana and reported
in 31 Ind. 479, where an information
under a statute was brought by a county
auditor duly elected to fill a vacancy,
against the party who had been appointed
and who refused to surrender possession,
the question arose as to whether the relator in the information could recover the
fees and emoluments of the office, during
the time the appointee, Douglass, retained possession after Wright's election,
and also if the former was in any event
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entitled to retain from the gross receipts
the amount paid out for necessary clerk
hire during that period.
It was held by the majority of the
court, ELLIOT, J., delivering the opinion,
"that the relator was entitled to recover
all the fees and emoluments received
by the party in possession, he having
unlawfully held the possession without
the assent of the relator either express
or implied, and as he was an intruder,
and performed the labor against the protest and express will of the relator, the
law would not imply a promise to pay
any compensation for his services, and
hence he was not even entitled to claim
a deduction from the fees received by
him, for his necessary clerk hire. This
case, at first, seems certainly to go the
length of deciding the point, that one
performing the duties of an office to
which he is not legally entitled, has no
claim to any fees therefor, and if he
collects them will be responsible to the
lawful claimant. On a closer inspection, however, it will be seen that the
appointee, Douglass, was dearly an intruder after the election and commissioning
of the relator, and so far may be said to
have fraudulently received the fees of his
office. This view is also strengthened
from the fact that in the beginning of his
opinion, the judge says that "Douglass was a mere intruder after the relator Wright was elected, and the exercise
of the office was a usurpation. If this
was in any degree the basis of the decision, it would certainly be no authority
where the party in possession was apparently legally and'duly elected.
In the foregoing opinion of ELLIOT,
J., the cases of Glascock v. Lyons, 20 Ind.
1, and United Staes v. Addison, 6 Wallace 291, were cited as confirmatory of
the views therein expressed. The first of
these cases was where one Glascock sued
Lyons for the fees of the office of sheriff
of Fountain county, averring that he,
Glascock, had been duly elected sheriff,
but that Lyons, by false and fraudulent

447

means and practice, had secured a certificate of election and had been commissioned and qualified. These facts were
admitted to be true. And the court in
delivering their opinion say: " Taking
the facts as stated to be true, Glascock
is entitled to recover the fees received by
the defendant, and there is no good reason in conscience why the defendant,
under the circumstances, should have even
a bare compensation for his services
during the time he performed the duties
of the office." There is manifestly an
intimation here, that under other circumstances the party who performed the
services or duties of the office might be
entitled to some compensation, that is,
where there was no proof of false or
fraudulent practice on the part of the
officer in possession ; at any rate it is not
binding as an authority on a different
state of facts.
In United States for the use of Crawford v. Addison, Crawford, being the
mayor of Georgetown, was a candidate
for re-election ; Addison was the opposing candidate. Crawford was returned
as elected, but the city councils, on a
count of the votes made by themselves,
declared that Addison was really elected,
and he was accordingly sworn into
office and entered upon its duties. On
a quo warranto against Addison there
was a judgment of ouster. He took
a writ of error and executed a bond
in $3000, to answer all damages if he
failed to make his writ good. The writ
was subsequently dismissed, and Crawford brought suit on the bond to recover
the amount of salary received by Addison from the time of the date of the
bond to the dismissal of the writ of error.
The court held that he was entitled
to recover. Here the claim was only
for the time Addison held the office,
after it had been decided that he was not
legally entitled, and did not touch the
question as to the previous time during
which he discharged the duties of mayor.
In both of these cases it will be per-
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ceired that the point was not decided,
as to whether the incumbent of an office,
who is afterwards determined not to have
been legally elected, is entitled to retain
any of the fees or emoluments received
by him while in office. In Dorsey v.
Smythe, 28 California 21, though the
exact point did not fairly arise, the
broad principle was asserted, that the
salary is incident to the office, and not to
the exercise or performance of the duties.
In this case Platt and Dorsey were opposing candidates for -the office of
district attorney. Platt was declared
elected, but Dorsey contested his -election on the ground of illegal votes, and
the contest was determined in Dorsey's
favor, who had previously qualified and
demanded the possession of the office
from the then incumbent, but was refused.
Upon suit brought to recover
the salary, not from the incumbent, but
from the county, it was held that he,
Dorsey, was entitled to recover such
salary from the date of his election,
the court saying: "that if it should
appear that the party demanding the
office had at the time a title thereto the
party in possession could claim nothing
on the score of services rendered, for
on the determination of the question he
is a usurper ab initio, the salary is incident to the office and not to the performance of the duties."
This doctrine was affirmed in Stratn
v. Oulton, 28 California 44, and still
more recently in the case of Carroll v.
Liebenthaler, not yet reported, where
RHODES, J., in his opinion, says : "The
principle that the salary annexed to an
office is incident to the title to the office,
and not to its occupation and exercise,
is determined by the cases of Dorsey v.
Smythe and Stratton T. Oulto0n."
In City of Philadelphiav. Given, 60
Penna. St. 136, the plaintiff below had
received a certificate of election as city
commissioner, and had acted as such for
seven months, when on termination of
a contest it was decided that he had not

been elected. He then brought suit for
his salary during the time of his service.
The court held that he could not recover,
because he bad not qualified according
to law by giving security; but Tuoxrsox, C. J., in a concurring opinion,
placed his judgment on the broad ground
that the right to salary was dependent
on the legal title to the office.
Mott v. Connelly, 50 Barb. 516, is a
somewhat contrary opinion, inasmuch
at least, as it is there held, by SUTHERLAND, J., that certain de facto tax
commissioners were entitled to recover
their salary from the city controller, for
the time they performed the duties of
the office, notwithstanding it was opposed by the tax commissioners who
claimed to be the only ones legally
elected, the judge saying: "The commissioners in office cannot be said to
have usurped their office or intruded
without color of right or title. The question of right must be determined in
another action ; and until it is, the present commissioners are entitled to the
salary."
Such is a brief outline of the cases
on this subject, from a review of which
it will doubtless be considered that the
action for money had and received will
lie by the party who is legally entitled
to recover the fees and emoluments of
office, against one who usurps or intrudes
into the same. And unless the opinions
of the judges in Glascock v. Lyons,
Dorsey v. Smythe, and Carroll v. Leibenthaler, are deemed mere dicta as regards
the points not directly before them, will
probably be construed as countenancing
the broader doctrine, that such action
will lie in all cases, where the party
who is ultimately decided to have been
elected, sues the party in office for the
fees of such office. However this may
be, there is no case in which the point
has been directly decided, and if the
question should arise, it will be found
to be untrammelled by any absolute
authority.
W. W. WisTz, Jr.
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UNITED STATES v. CITY OF DULUTH

ET AL.

The United States may bring an injunction in the proper Circuit Court to
protect improvements which they are making under the authority of Congress in

navigable waters, from injury, which will be caused by works of internal improvement within state limits and authorized by state authority. The power of the
Federal Government, when called into exercise, is in such cases not only paramount but exclusive, and cannot lawfully be interfered with to any extent.
Whether the work prosecuted under state authority will have the effect to interfere with that prosecuted under the Federal authority, is a question upon which
the opinions of the government engineers, while entitled to great consideration,
are not conclusive.
Where the injury threatened is of a character not easily remedied if the injunction be refused, and there is no denial that the act charged is contemplated, a
temporary injunction should be granted unless the case made by the bill is satisfactorily refuted.
THIS was a bill brought by the United States for an injunction
and relief.
The bill stated that the government of the United States, by
means of appropriations made by Congress, are Making certain
improvements at the mouth of the St. Louis river, intended to
keep open and to deepen the channel at that point between the
western end of Lake Superior and the body of water called
Superior Bay. This bay is separated from the main body of the
lake by a narrow tongue of land a few hundred yards in width,
starting from the Minnesota shore on the north, and projecting
itself south toward the Wisconsin shore about six miles.
Between the southern extremity of this narrow strip of land
called Minnesota Point and the Wisconsin shore of the lake, the
St. Louis river and the waters of Superior Bay make an outlet
into Lake Superior, and through the outlet or channel (for the
St. Louis river here makes a current), vessels navigating the
lakes make their way to the harbor of Superior City, Wisconsin,
and to the inner harbor of the city of Duluth. This latter city
is situated in the state of Minnesota, at the upper end of Minnesota Point, and has not only its harbor in Superior Bay, but has
its wharf on the lake, where vessels receive and discharge their
cargoes.
The improvements on which the United States have been at
work for two or three years, are at the mouth of the St. Louis
river, between the south end of Minnesota Point and the WisconVOL. XIX.-29
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sin shore, and, as the bill alleges, are intended to narrow the
channel at that point by piers on each side of it, that the body
of water carried by the St. Louis river and the bay of Superior,
through this channel, may be increased in velocity, so as to
deepen the channel and keep it free from the deposits which have
a tendency to fill it up, and thus obstruct the entrance and exit
of vessels into and from Superior Bay.
The bill then alleges that- the defendants are engaged in
cutting a canal across the upper end of Minnesota Point, near
Duluth, through which the waters of Superior Bay will flow into
Lake Superior, and by which the current of the St. Louis river,
now flowing through the outlet already described, will be diverted
into the canal; and that the result will be to render ineffectual the
efforts of the United States to protect and deepen the natural
channel at the mouth of the St. Louis, and to cause it to be filled
up so as to become incapable of navigation.
To prevent this result the court is asked to enjoin the defendants from the further prosecution of the work on the canal.
Mr. Davis, U. S. District Attorney for Minnesota (with whom
Mr. Barlm, Attorney-General of Wisconsin, and Mr. S'pooner),
for the United States.
Mr. Cornell, Attorney-General for Minnesota, and Mr. Masterson, for the City of Duluth.
MILLER, C. J.-While the defendants do not deny the right
of the United States to come as a party plaintiff into her own
courts to seek protection for her own interest, they claim that
the real plaintiffs in this suit are the state of Winconsin and
the City of Superior, while the United States are mere nominal
parties, and that the proceeding is instigated by rivalry and
jealousy, and has for its purpose the injury of Duluth by impeding the growth of her commerce, by checking the improvement
of her harbor, to -which the canal is essential.
Of all this the court can know nothing judicially. The piesent suit was authorized by the proper officer of the government,
namely, the attorney-general; and in doing so, he appears to
have acted on the request of the engineering bureau having in
charge the work threatened with injury. This injury, if the allegations of the bill be true, is a direct interference by the defend-
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ants with the operations of the Federal Government in the
improvement of the navigation of the lake at that point.
We cannot assume that the government of the United States,
or its officers who bring this suit, are governed by a spirit of hostility to Duluth, nor can we make that the subject of inquiry on
this occasion.
If the allegations of the bill be true, we have no doubt of the
right of the officers of the Federal Government to bring this suit
in the name of the United States to protect her rights, and
esteem it a much more appropriate mode of doing so than by the
physical force of the war department.
That the protection, improvement, and general control of the
navigable waters of the United States are within the constitutional competency of Congress there can be no doubt.
This power has been so often asserted, both in Congress and
in the Supreme Court, that references to adjudged cases would
be an affectation of learning. No one has denied this for many
years past, and it is not denied by counsel on the present occasion.
It is, however, asserted that the states have a concurrent right
to authorize improvements on the navigable waters of the United
States in which their citizens are interested, so far as these waters
lie within their territorial limits; and it is shown by affidavits and
by the statutes of Minnesota that the canal here complained of
is authorized by said state, and is important to her commerce,
and is within her territory.
That such a power can be exercised by the states' may be admitted, when it does not injure the general interest of commerce,
and when it does not conflict with any control assumed by the
Federal Government over the same locality.
But all the reported cases which concede this power in the
states, agree that it exists only while the Congress of the United
States refrains from the assertion of its authority, and that when
the latter is called into exercise it is not only paramount but
exclusive.
Such is the principle asserted by the Supreme Court in Crandall v. .evada, 6 Wall. 35, and in Gilman v. Philadelphia,3
Wall. 713, and in Cooley v. The Board of Tardens, 12 How. 319,
in all of which the question is thoroughly examined.
Nor can any doubts be entertained, 'from the facts before us,
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that the Congress of the United States has called into exercise
the Federal power in the improvement of the navigation between
Lake Superior and Superior Bay.
They have made appropriations for this purpose more than
once, one of which is so recent as the month of March last, which
is yet unexpended, and the mode of expending of this money
being confided by Congress to certain officers of the government,
it must be held that whatever is done by them in furtherance of
that purpose, is done under the authority of Congress.
It is, however, claimed that inasmuch as Congress, in the same
bill which contains the last appropriation referred to, also appropriated a like sum for the improvement of the harbor of Duluth,
it is to be inferred that Congress thereby recognised the canal
now complained of as a legitimate work.
In support of this view, reference is made to a joint resolution
of the Minnesota legislature, in response to which it is claimed
this latter appropriation was made.
But we can draw no such inference from the actio' of Congress,
for while that joint resolution does mention this canal, with
other matters, as one mode of improving the Duluth harbor, and
declares that the system under which Congress was seeking to
improve the entrance to Superior Bay (which was supposed to be
as useful to Duluth as to Superior City), is a failure, it does
not appear that Congress adopted these views, for it left both
appropriations under the control of the engineer corps of the
war department, which both then and now continue to assert that
the work at the mouth of St. Louis river is the true mode of
improving the entrance to Superior Bay, in which are the harbors
of Superior City and of Duluth.
We must hold, then, that this work is authorized by the Congress of the United States, and is prosecuted under their authority, and that the canal is not.
The remaining question to be considered is, whether the allegation of the bill, that this canal will seriously interfere with that
work, is sustained by the evidence before us.
In this aspect of the case it is to be understood that although
no answer to the bill is filed, we have admitted counter affidavits.
The complainant supports the bill by the reports of the engineer bureau, and by the affidavits of the officers of that corps
engaged on the work, and by those of other civil engineers.
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The defendants have a large number of affidavits showing that
no such effect on that work will follow the opening of the canal,
as is alleged in the bill.
It is urged by counsel for complainant that the reports of the
engineers and their statements, made as is claimed on accurate
surveys, should be held conclusive. But while we concede that
their action in determining the best mode of improving the en-"
trance to the bay cannot be questioned here, we cannot give such
effect to their opinions on the question of the influence of the
canal on that improvement, though we concede to their opinion
the value which their station and character merit.
The affidavits on both sides are numerous. They demonstrate
what all courts and juries have so often felt, that where the question is one of opinion and not of fact, though that opinion should
be founded on scientific principles or professional skill, the inquiry is painfully unsatisfactory and the answers strangely contradictory.
In this emergency I am relieved by a principle which has generally governed me, and which I believe governs nearly all judges
in applications for preliminary injunctions.
It is that, when the danger or injury threatened is of a character which cannot be easily remedied if the injunction is refused,
and there is no denial that the act charged is contemplated, the
temporary injunction should be granted, unless the case made
by the bill is satisfactorily refuted by the defendant.
In this case I am not satisfied that it is so refuted. I am
inclined personally to believe that the effect of opening the canal
without the breakwater, or some other protection to the natural
action of the flow of water through it, will tend to fill up the
channel at the mouth of the river.
It is said in answer to this, that no irreparable damage can
ensue from making the canal, and that more injury will result
to defendants from stopping the work, than can arise from its
completion.
But I do not agree that the damage, if there shall be any from
the canal, can be repaired without immense difficulty, and probably not at all. While the canal might be closed with great
expense, the deposits which may have accumulated at the mouth
of the river before the question is settled, may never be removed,
or the removal may be too costly to justify the attempt.
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And in a case of interference with the authority of the Federal
Government, the court cannot consider the relative amount of
injury to accrue to the party thus interfering, and to the government. Such a principle would tend to encourage interference
with Federal authority, when it ought to be repressed.
On the other hand, if on the final hearing it shall be made to
appear that complainants are mistaken, the injunction can be
dissolved, and the work completed.
And the truth in the matter can in the mean time be ascertained
by accurate surveys and calculations impartially made, either by
officers of the government, or by competent engineers appointed
by the court, or by depositions subject to cross examination; so
that when the court comes to decide, it will have thd- subject
within its control, and will have something more than ex parte
affidavits, some of which are by n'o means clear or precise in their
statements.
Or if before the final hearing it shall be made to appear in
the manner indicated, or in any other manner satisfactory to the
court, that the canal can be protected by a breakwater, so as to
prevent the too rapid diversion of water from the bay, or can in
any other manner be completed without injury to the government
works, and the complainants put their work in that condition, the
injunction may be modified or dissolved.
In conclusion, I take the liberty of saying that since Congress
has taken this matter in hand by appropriating money for the
improvement of these harbors, it should cause the adoption of
some comprehensive plan for the improvement of both harbors,
and not leave it to the conflicting interest of the two cities, or
to the adverse action of the state and Federal authorities.
Nor can I doubt, if the defendants here should ask of the
department in charge of these improvements, a careful inquiry
into the plan which they believe essential to their interests, that
some mode of prosecuting such improvement would be found
which would meet the approval of that department, and obviate
the necessity of a final decision by this court.
I am happy in the assistance of Judge DILLON, of this circuit,
on the hearing of this application, and in his concurrence in
these views.
An injunction according to the prayer will be allowed.

UNITED STATES v. LOWE.

United States Circuit Court, Southern -Districtof Georgia.
THE UNITED STATES v. ANDREW LOWE

ET AL.

Payment of duties to a Confederate collector of customs during the war was
not in effect a payment to the United States, and is no defence to an action on
the customs bond.
The fact that such payment was made under threat of sale of the goods by the
Confederate authorities, did not make such payment a defence to the bond. The
Confederate officer as to this matter was a mere trespasser.
By the acceptance of a bond for payment of duties within three years, the
goods meanwhile to remain in the public stores at the port of entry, the United
States did not assume any duty as insurer or even as bailee of the goods; and
the facts that for several years there was no United States collector pre'ent at that

port to receive the duties and deliver the goods, and that the goods were taken
possession of by an insurrectionary government, do not constitute any defence to
the bond.
THIS was an action of debt on a customs bond. The facts are stated
in the charge of the court.
J. D. Pope, District Attorney, for the United States.
Law, Lovel & Falligant,for defendants.
WOODS, Circuit J., charged the jury as follows :-This is an action of
debt brought by the United States against the defendants upon their
joint and several bond under seal, dated the 1st day of December 1860,
whereby they bind themselves to pay to the United States the sum of
$2700. The bond is subject to the condition that "if the obligors, or
either of them, shall, on or before the expiration of three years, to be
computed from the date of the importation of the goods, wares, and
merchandise therein mentioned, well and truly pay, or cause to be paid,
unto the collector of customs for the port of Savannah, for the time
being, the sum of $1360.54, or the amount of duties to be ascertained
as due and owing on goods, wares, and merchandise imported by A.
Lowe & Co., in the British ship ' Shandon,' Munro master, from Liverpool, consisting of four hundred and twenty-five tons of pig-iron, or
shall in the mode prescribed by law on or before the expiration of the
three years afore-aid withdraw the said goods from the public stores
where they may be deposited at the port of Savannah, then this obligation is to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and virtue."
The bond is produced in evidence, and its execution is not disputed.
The only other evidence in the case is the testimony of the witness
Winkler, which is in substance as follows: "The words written across
the face of the bond, namely: ' cancelled by withdrawal and payment
of duties, this 30th day of August 1861, Z. N. Winkler, clerk,' were
written by me the day they bear date. I was at that time bond and
debenture clerk under John Boston, who was Confederate collector of
customs at Savannah. It was in the capacity of his clerk that I made
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the endorsement upon the bond. On the back of the bond are the
words and figures '$1300, paid August 30th 1861,' which were also
written by me on the day they bear date. On the 30th day of August
1861. there were no United States customs officers in Savannah. At
that time the United States had not the custody of the articles mentioned in the bond. At the time the goods were delivered to defendants
they were in the possession of the Confederate States. If the duties
had not been paid by them they would have been sold by the Confederate States. The United States did not resume their authority over
the custom-house and port of Savannah till about the 22d day of December 1864."
This comprises all the testimony in the case, and there is no dispute
between the parties nor any question of fact. If we have misstated any
fact or omitted any fact, it is your province, gentlemen, to correct us.
On this tate of facts the defendants claim that the plaintiff ought not
to recover.
First. Because the payment of the duties on the goods mentioned in
the bond, to the Confederate collector of customs, was in effect a payment to the United States, and the bond was discharged thereby.
Second. That the United States undertook, by necessary implication
from the terms of the bond, that there should be a collector of customs
or other agent of the United States at Savannah, during the three years
specified in the bond, to receive the duties or to ascertain the amount
to be due, and to deliver the goods to the defendants on the payment
of the duties, and having failed in this, and having abandoned the
goods, and the same having fallen into the hands of what is known as
the Confederate States, to which the defendants were obliged to pay
duties to prevent their property from being sold, the United States cannot recover in this action.,
It is not claimed that the duties were ever paid directly to the United
States, nor that the money ever came to the treasury of the United
States, or to the hand of any officer authorized to receive it for the
United States. Neither is it claimed that the property was lost to
defendants. On the contrary, it is not denied that defendants received
their property when they demanded it. Nor is it claimed that the payment of these duties was compelled by superior force or irresistible
power, but only by a refusal to deliver the property unless payment of
the duties to the Confederate collector of customs was made.
On the first ground of defence raised, we instruct you that payment
to an agent or officer of the Confederate States of the duties mentioned
in the bond, was no payment to the United States nor substitute therefor, nor does it constitute any excuse for non-payment to the United
States.
On the importation of the goods the duties became due and payable
to the United States; the defendants became the debtors of the United
States, and their obligation to pay was evidenced and secured by the
bond in suit. Their debt could only be discharged by payment to the
United States. It is no answer to say that if the duties had not been
paid to the Confederate officer the goods would have been sold. The
Confederate officer who held these goods and exacted this payment,
was, to state his character in the mildest form, a naked trespasser, without authority or color of authority. The whole Confederate power
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under which this officer acted was a usurpation of unlawful authority;
its acts can have no force as law in divesting or transferring rights, or
as authority for any act opposed to the just authority of the Federal Government. So that the case stands in the same plight as if John Boston
had on his own motion and with the strong hand taken possession of
these goods and exacted a ransom for their delivery to the owners. It
can' scarcely be claimed that a payment to him under such circumstances
would discharge a debt due to the United States.
Had Boston sold the goods on refusal of defendants to pay the duties
to him, the defendants might have had their action against him or the
purchaser for unlawful conversion, but such unlawful conversion would
not divest the United States of its right to the duties upon the goods.
On the second branch of the defence, we say to you, that by the terms
of the bond the United States entered into no obligation with defbndants, the failure to perform which would release defendants from their
liabilities on the bond. The United States were not bound, as a condition precedent to a recovery on this bond, at all times to have a col-'
lector of customs at Savannah to whom payment of duties could be
made. The absence of a collector of customs for a space of time no
more defeated the bond than the failure and closing of a bank at which
a promissory note is made payable discharges the note.
The only obligations created by this bond are the obligations assumed
by the makers. They owe duties to the United States; they have the
option either to pay them at once or to give bond for their payment,
and place their goods in a bonded warehouse at their own risk and expense. If the goods are burned it is their loss; if they are stolen it is
their own loss; if they are captured by the superior force of insurgents
against the United States it is their loss. The United States are not
insurers, nor even bailees. Nothing short of a voluntary abandonment
of the goods by the United States, or their wrongful conversion by the
United States, could release the defendants from their obligation to pay
duties. The goods were not wrongfully converted, nor is there any evidence that they were voluntarily abandoned; on the contrary, the court
judicially knows the historical fact that the custom-house and bonded
warehouses of the United States at Savannah were taken from the possession of the United States by the superior and irresistible force of an
armed rebellion, against which the United States never agreed to become insurers.
The obligation to pay these duties secured by the bond is absolute,
and nothing but their payment can discharge the bond-unless the conversion of the goods, or their voluntary abandonment by the United
States might be an excuse, neither of which is claimed or proved.
The execution of the bond is not denied. We instruct you that if you
believe all the testimony on which defendants rely, still it constitutes
no defence to this action, and that it is your duty to return a verdict for
the plaintiff for the amount of the duties in gold, namely, $1360.54,
with interest from the 22d day of December 1864, the date when the
United States received possession of the port and custom-house of
Savannah.
The jury rendered the following verdict:-" We the jury, under the
charge !f the court, find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1360.54,
with interest in currency, from the 22d day of December 1864."

458

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v. LINCOLN CO.

United States Circuit Court, District of Nebraska.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. LINCOLN COUNTY.
The interest of the General Government in the Union Pacific Railroad Company, though chartered and aided by Congress, is not such as to exempt the
company and its property from taxation by a state through which the road is
located and operated.
The doctrine of the implied exemption of Federal instrumentalities from state
taxation considered, and applied to this corporation, and the result reached that it
is not such an instrumentality, and if, in any case, it is such, that the paramount
rights of the government would not be affected, and, under the Acts of Congress,
could not be injured by any subordinate right of the stat6 to tax and sell the
property of the corporation.
Under the legislation of Nebraska, the county of Lincoln has the right to tax
railroads in the adjoining territory attached to it for revenue purposes.

THis was a bill to restrain the defendant, who was the county treasurer of Lincoln county, Nebraska, from proceeding to collect taxes
upon the property of the complainant, assessed and levied under the
revenue law of the state : Act of 1869, p. 179. Section 17 of this act
provided for the assessment and taxation of the property of canal, turnpike, railway, and other corporations, and made it the duty of certain
officers of these corporations to list, under oath, "all their personal property, which shall be held to include road-bed, depots, water stations,
* * and such other realty as is necessary for the daily business operations of said road," &e. Returns are to be made to the auditor of state,
on or before the first Monday of March, annually, of the amount of such
property situated in each organized county," &c.
Taxes thus assessed are collected by sale and distress of. personal
property (sect. 49), are made a perpetual lien on real property (sect. 51),
and real estate may be sold for judgment-taxes when the collector is
not able to make the same by distress and sale of personal property:
sect. 54.
Under this act a list was furnished by the auditor of state to the
officers of the complainant, and the general superintendent returned the
company as having 246 miles of road in "Lincoln county and west to
the state line," of the average value of $ 16,000 per mile.
Upon this length of road, and upon this valuation, the county authorities of Lincoln county assessed the property of the company; the total
valuation being, as alleged, $3,936,000, and the amount of taxes charged
for the year 1869 was $45,264 for state, county, and school purposes,
while for the same year the said county, upon all other persons, corporations, and property, only levied taxes to the amount, in the aggregate,
of $6850.
The pleadings showed that the county of Lincoln was the most westerly organized county in the state, through which the road of the complainants runs; that immediately west of Lincoln county is a large tract
of unorganized territory, west of which and extending to the west line
of the state is the unorganized county of Cheyenne. The road runs
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through this unorganized territory as well as through Cheyenne
county.
By the averments of the bill, supported by affidavits, it appeared
that the length of the complainants' road through Lincoln county to the
west line of the state, instead of being 246 miles was only about 176
miles; of which but eight miles were in Lincoln county (the road crossing
only a corner of the county), and the residue of the 176 miles was in
Cheyenne county 105 miles, and in the unorganized territory, between
that and Lincoln county, 63 miles.
The bill sought to restrain the collection of the tax for the three
following reasons :1. Because 246 miles of road-bed had been assessed by the authorities of Lincoln county, whereas only 176 miles of the road-bed are
situate in Lincoln county and the attached territory west of it to the
state line.
2. Because Lincoln county was not by law authorized to tax any
portion of the road-bed or property of the defendant, except such as is
situate within its geographical limits.
3. Because the state of Nebraska had no power to subject to taxation
for state purposes the road-bed, rolling-stock, and other property neces.
sary for the use and operation of the complainants' road; such power
resting, as it is claimed, exclusively in the government of the United
States.
On February 15th 1869 the legislature of Nebraska passed an act
"to define the western boundary of Lincoln county," and after defining
it the act makes this important provision, to wit: "That all the unorganized country lying west of the western boundary of the county of
Lincoln, and east of the east line of Cheyenne county, and south of the
North Platte river, be and the same is hereby attached to the said
county of Lincoln for judicial and revenue purposes, and that the
county of Cheyenne be and the same is attached for judicial and revenue purposes to said dounty of Lincoln :" Laws of Neb. 1869, p. 249.
The company was incorporated by Act of Congress of July 1st 1862:
12 Stat. at Large 489. This act was subsequently amended in some
essential particulars, especially by the Act of July 2d 1864 : 13 Id. 386.
The incorporating statute is entitled "An act to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri river to the
Pacific Ocean, and to secure the government the use of the same for
postal, military, and other purposes."
By this act Congress incorporated certain individuals, their associates
and successors, as "The Union Pacific Railroad Company," with authority to build a continuous railroad and telegraph from a point on the
one hundredth meridian to the western boundary of Nevada territory.
It fixed the amount of the capital stock and shares, and declared that
"the stockholders should constitute said body politic and corporate."
The government has no stock in the road. though it has five directors
not stockholders, against fifteen company directors.
The act grants the company the right of way through the public
lands; and "for the purpose of aiding in the construction of said railroad and telegraph line, and to secure the safe and speedy transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of war, and public stores thereon,"
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makes it an extensive grant of lands, and provides for the issuing of
patents therefor.
And for the same purposes the United States agreed to, and did issue
its thirty year 6 per cent. bonds to the company, to the amount of
$16,000 per mile, for each section of forty miles, which bonds, the
original act declared, "shall ipso facto constitute a first mortgage on
the whole of the railroad and telegraph, together with the rolling-stock,
fixtures, and property of every kind," and made specific provision as to
proceedings on the failure of the company to re deem the bonds.
By the Act of July 1864 this was changed, and the company authorized to issue its "first mortgage bonds to an amount not exceeding the
bonds of the United States," and the lien of the United States bonds
was declared to be subordinate to the bonds so issued by the company.
These grants to the company are declared to be "made upon condition (1) that the company shall pay the bonds of the United States at
maturity; (2) shall keep their line and road in repair and use; (3)
transport mails, troops, &c., giving the government the preference, at
fair and reasonable rates of compensation, the amount thus earned to
be applied in payment of the bonds, as well as five per cent. of the net
earnings of the road after its completion. By the 17th section of the
act it is provided that if the road, when finished, is for an unreasonable
time permitted to remain out of repair, or unfit for use, Congress is authorized to put the same in repair and use, and reimburse the government for expenditures thus caused, from the income of the road.
The 18th section provides that when the net earnings of the road
exceed ten per cent. upon its cost, Congress may reduce, fix, and regulate rates of fare thereon, and declares that "the better to accomplish
the object of this act, to wit: To promote the public interest and welfare by the construction of said railroad and telegraph line and keeping
the same in working order, and to secure the government at all times
(but particularly in times of war), the use and benefits of the same for
postal, military, and other purposes, Congress may, at any time, having
due regard for the rights of said companies named herein, add to, alter,
amend, or repeal this act."
The act also contains provisions that so far as the public and government are concerned, the said railroad and branches shall be operated as
one connected and continuous line. '
There is no provision in any Act of Congress relating to this company respecting the taxation of it or its property by the states through
which this road may run.
At the date of the passage of the act incorporating the company,
Nebraska was in a territorial condition under the Act of 1854, organizing the territories of Nebraska and Kansas.
In 1867 Nebraska was admitted into the Union "upon an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever."
By the enabling Act of Congress of April 10th 1864, Nebraska was
required to, and subsequently did in her constitution, disable herself
from taxing "lands or property therein belonging to or which may
hereafter be purchased by the United States ;" and accordingly her
revenue laws, in terms, exempt from taxation the property of the
United States.
A. J. Poppleton and E. Wakely, for the complainant.
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J. A1. Woolworth, for the defendant.
DILLON, Circuit J.-The authorities of the state of Nebraska have
assessed and levied, for the year 1869, taxes upon the property of the
Union Pacific Railroad' Company situate therein. The company brings
the present bill, in this court, to restrain the collection of these taxes.
No question is made concerning jurisdiction. The cause is before the
court on the motion of the company to continue in force the injunction
allowed in vacation, and has been ably argued by counsel on the merits
of the application.
I. One of the grounds for the injunction is fundamental in its nature,
and if well taken is decisive, not only of the present case, but against
the power of the state, in any event, to subject the property of the company to taxation by its authority. To this ground, therefore, we shall
first direct our attention.' It is that the state of Nebraska has no power
to levy a tax upon any property of the Union Pacific Railroad Company
which is appurtenant to, or necessary for the use and operation of its
road. The argument in support of this proposition is, that the corporation was created by Congress, and not by the state; that it was created
because it was deemed by Congress a fit instrumentality or means of
exercising the constitutional powers of Carrying 'on, prim6ting, or facilitating the operations, 'or executing the duties of the Geneial Government, and that if it be such instrumentality'or means, it is settled 'that
it is
beyond the taxiing power of the state.,
Reliance
is placed upon the cases of .Mculgoch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, and Osborn v. The Bank 6f the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, in
which it was held bj the Supreme Court that this bank "1as the great
instrument by which the fiscal operations of the gbvernment were
effected," and "nsa public corporation, created for public and national
purposes," was not, on its capital or in its operations, taxable br the
states. In a word, it is claimed by'the company that as espects imm'unity from taxation, it stands precisely in the situation of 'the bank, and
that taxation of it by the states is unconstitutional'for the same reasons
that in those cases the laws of Maryland 'and of Ohio t xing the bank,
were adjudged to be invalid.
The defendant contioverts these propositions, and contends that the
Union Pacific Railroad' Company, though chartered by Congress, is essentially a "private corporation, whose principal object is individual trade
and individual profit, and not a public corporation, created for public
and national purposes ;" and denies that it is an instrument, agency, or
means of the General 'Goernment, in such a sense, as oh this ground t6
exempt it by necessary implication from taxation by the states.
- ,
The cases referred to undoubtedly establish the doctrine that no state
has the right to tax the means, agencies, or instrumentalities rightfully
employed within the states by the general government for the execution
of its powers; and this doctrine is 'adhered to, and, when under.it'd
with the necessary qualifications, declared to be sound by the Supreme
Court in its latest adjudications on the subject: Thomyson v. Pacfic
Railroad, 9 'Wall. 579,' 591;' National Bank v. Corhmonwealth, Id.
353, 361.
The doctrine of the implied exemption of Federal instrumentalities
from state taxation, its iationale, and its limitation is so clearly stated
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by the learned justice assigned to this circuit, in the case last cited, that
his observations may be advantageously extracted to aid our present
inquiries. The case related to the right ;f the states to tax shares of
the national banks, and "it is argued," says Mr. Justice MILLER, "that
the banks, being instrumentalities of the Federal Government, by which
some of its important operations are conducted, cannot be subjected to
such state legislation. It is certainly true that the Bank of the United
States and its capital were held to be exempt from state taxation on the
ground here stated, and this principle, laid down in the case of
JIk Culloch v. The State of .Maryland,has been repeatedly affirmed by
this court. But the doctrine has its foundation in the proposition that
the right of taxation may be so used in such cases as to destroy the instrumentalities by which the government proposes to effect its lawful purposes in the states,. and it certainly cannot be maintained that banks or
other corporations or instrumentalities of the government are to be
wholly withdrawn from the operation of state legislation. * * * The
principle we are discussing has its limitation, a limitation growing out
of the necessity on which the principle itself is founded. That limitation is, that the agencies of the Federal Government are only exempted
from state legislation, so far as that legislation may interfere with or
impair their efficiency in performing the functions by which they are
designed to serve that government. Any other rule would convert a
principle founded alone in the necessity of securing to the government
of the United States the means of exercising its legitimate powers, into
an unauthorized and unjustifiable invasion of the rights of the states.
It is only when the state law incapacitates the banks from discharging
their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitutional :" 9
Wall. 361, 362. The state legislation, then, to come within the operation of the principle must relate not simply to an agent but to an agency
of the General Government, and must be of a character which incapacitates the agency to perform, or interferes with its efficiency in performing its duties to the government, or it must (as in the case of a tax,
which if valid at all, is valid to any extent the state may see fit to press
it) assert a principle in its nature antagonistic to the Federal instrumentality, and which may be exercised to ldestroy it.
Having thus defined and limited the principle on which the company
relies as exempting it from the right of the state to tax its property,
the next step in the inquiry is to determine whether this corporation is
a Federal instrumentality within the meaning of the rule, and one which
might be destroyed by the state if it was permitted to tax it.
Upon the most careful examination of Ithe Acts of Congress relating
to this company, and upon the best reflection I have been able to give
the subject, I am of opinion that the interest of the government in the
corporation, though organized under Congressional authority, is not such
as will bring it within the principle of implied exemption from the taxing power of the state.
That there is in any Act of Congress an express provision on the
subject of taxation or a prohibition to the state to tax the company is
not claimed.
The Union Pacific Railroad Company is a private corporation, in the
sense that all of itscapital stock is owned by the stockholders, and
these constitute the corporate body. The government has no stock in
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the road. But in another sense the corporation is a public one as
respects the government, and the relations it sustains to the government
are very peculiar. The government created the corporation, and both
authorized and aided the building of the road. It was to be constructed
within the territories of the United States, and if Congress was not the
only power which could erect said corporation, and authorize it to build
the road therein, it is certain that no road could have been constructed
through the national domain against the will of Congress.
The purpose of Congress is manifest, not only from the nature of the
legislative provisions, but from the plain expression of it, both in the
title and in the body of the incorporating act.
It is declared in the 18th section that "the object of this act is to
promote the public interest and welfare by the construction of said railroad and telegraph line, and keeping the same in working order, and to
secure to the government at all times (but particularly in time of war)
the use and benefits of the same for postal, military, and other purposes," and to this end "Congress may at any time, having due regard
for the rights of said companies named herein, add to, alter, amend, or
repeal this act."
And to the same effect is the title, which is "An act to aid in the
construction of a railroad, &c., and to secure to the government the use
of the same for postal, military, and other purposes."
The government aided the corporation by giving it the right of way,
by granting it lands, and by issuing to it bonds which were originally
the first, but by the consent of Congress subsequently became the
second, mortgage or lien on the road. Now, the act shows (sects. 6,
17, 18) that the grants of corporate existence, of the right of way, of
lands, and of pecuniary aid, were all made upon the condition or the
consideration that the corporation should build the road and keep it in
repair and operation, so that the government might at all times have the
use and benefit of the same for postal, military, or other purposes.
To prevent this object from being defeated, Congress reserved the
right to repair and run the road (sect. 17), and at all times to legislate
generally with respect to rights of the company: Sect. 18.
The ownership of the road and its property is in the corporation. Its
bonds, by the consent of Congress, have been made a first mortgage;
and the government bonds are the second mortgage "on the whole line
of railroad and telegraph, together with the rolling-stock, fixtures, and
property of every kind and description." See sect. 5, Act July 1st
1862, and sect. 10, Act July 2d 1864. If these first mortgage bonds
are not paid, is it not clear that they may be foreclosed, and "the whole
line of the road and all its property" be sold to the purchaser, who
would thereby, as against the corporation and against the United States,
acquire the title unless the United States redeemed the debt? Such
purchaser would acquire the ownership of the road and its property,
but he would not acquire these discharged of the duty of the corporation to keep the road in repair and use, to run it as a continuous line in
connection with the other roads, and to transport the mails, troops,
stores, &c., of the government; nor would the sale under the mortgage
divest the government of its reserved right of legislative control, in
order to secure to the government the purposes for which it created the
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The purpose of these illustrations and their bearing on the question
under consideration are manifest. In its nature a tax is a debt or liability, though of a peculiar character, and whose enforcement, for reasons
of expediency, is usually provided for by a summary sale of property,
though it might in all cases and sometimes is directed or allowed to be
enforced by an ordinary action.
Congress had the power to create this corporation; it had the power
to make its grants conditioned upon the perfbrmance by the corporation
of certain duties; the power to reserve legislative control over it, as it
did, and these and other provisions of the act intended to secure to the
government the use of the road for postal, military, and other public
purposes, are not abrogated or abridged by the subsequent admission
of Nebraska into the Union as a state, and these rights are inalienable
in their nature without the consent of Congress, and not destructible
by any act of the company. The property of the company and the
right to operate the road may be sold or transferred, under the mortgage or otherwise, or it may be under a sale for taxes, but the purchaser
in either case will take his rights, subject to the fundamental conditions
on which the corporation exists, and subject to its public duties and
liabilities to the government.
The state cannot tax this corporation out of existence. It cannot
sell or destroy its franchise (derived from Congress), to be a corporation. The public duties which it owes to the government it will owe
into whosesoever hand its other subordinate and assignable franchises
or property may pass.
So far as the rights of the government are those of a mere creditor,
it may be true that it would be affected by a sale, in the same way as
any other creditor with like rights, but this is an inquiry into which
it is not necessary now to enter.
I conclude this discussion by stating that it results from the foregoing views :1. That the Union Pacific Railroad Company is not an instrument of
the government in such a sense as exempts it by implication from the
taxing power of the state through which its road may be located.
2. If it be in any sense a Federal instrumentality, the rights of the
government, under the incorporating act, are fully protected and reserved,
and any rights derived from a sale for taxes, under state authority, are
entirely subordinate to the original, paramount, and indefeasible rights
of the General Government, and cannot destroy the corporation nor incapacitate it from discharging any of its inalienable, fundamental, and
organic duties to the government. If so, then the case falls outside
the principle on which the corporation relies to sustain its application
for an injunction.
I think I can discover, in the more recent judgments of the Supreme
Court, evidences of a conviction on the part of the judges that the doctrine of implied exemption of Federal agencies from state taxation has
been carried quite to its limit, and that it will not be pressed to embrace a case of the character of that now under consideration.
IL It is next claimed by the company that there is no authority in
Lincoln county to tax any portion of the road situate beyond its limits
But in my judgment the Act of the 15th day of February 1869 (Laws
Neb., 1869, p. 249), is sufficient to authorize the action of the county
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in taxing the road-bed situate west of it. This act in terms attaches
the county of Cheyenne and the unorganized territory to Lincoln county
"for judicial and revenue purposes," and is to be construed in connection with the Revenue Act, enacted at the same time. Thus to the
word "county" as occurring in the General Revenue Act (sect. 17), is
to be annexed by construction as respects the county of Lincoln, the
words "and attached territory."
The same language which annexes it for revenue purposes is that
adopted in this and in-other acts of the state, for annexing unorganized
territory to organized counties for judicial purposes. It has always
been regarded as sufficient for the latter purpose, and if so, it is equally
so for the former, and great mischief would undoubtedly flow from any
new view on this subject.
III. The only retiaining ground for the injunction is that, conceding
the road is taxable, and that the county of Lincoln has authority to tax
all the road west of it to the state line, there are in fact only 176 miles
of road, while the county has assessed and is seeking to collect a tax
upon 246 miles-70 miles more than has any existence.
The difference in the tax is over $12,OQO, and if the company is right
that these 70 miles have no existence, it would strike the mind as unconscionable for the authorities of the state to insist upon availing themselves of the mistake by which this amount was erroneously assessed.
But whether equity can relieve I prefer to determine when the precise
facts are ascertained; and mean time as to this, I will order the injunction to be continued in force; but in all other. respects it will stand
dissolved.

Court of Common Pleas of kfeigs County, Ohio.
WILLIAMSON v. HALL zT

AL.

By way of executory bequest personal property may be limited over after the
-determination of a life interest, in like manner and to the same extent as real
-estate.
A. by his will directed that his wife should "1hold and have the use of all my
property, both real and personal, during her natural life, to raise and school my
children with, and at her decease an equal division to be made between my
children; that is to say, * * * my daughters shall have the movable property, to
be divided between them." Held, 1. That the will created an express trust of
the personal as well as real property, for the maintenance and education of the
children. 2. That the title to the personal estate was in the widow for life, with
remainder -te the daughters.
The widow having converted the personalty, and invested the proceeds in real
estate in her own name in fee simple, it was held that in equity it must be treated
as if she had taken the title to herself for life, with remainder to the daughters.

Tirs was a petition in the nature of a bill in equity for the partition
and distribution of the estate of John Hall, who died in 1824.
The second elause of his will was as follows :"I will that my beloved wife, Sarah Hall, do hold and have the use
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of all my property, both real and personal, during her natural life, to
raise and school my children with, and at her decease an equal division
to be made between my children; that is to say, my six sons (naming
them) do have and hold for ever the 300 acres of land that I now hold
in Meigs county, Lebanon township, to be equally divided between
thei ; and that my six daughters (naming them) shall have the movable property, to be divided between them."
He then provided that on the final partition and distribution of his
estate, such contribution should be made by one class to the other as
would render the shares of equal value.
Shortly after the probate of the will, the widow, who was nominated
executrix, converted the personal estate, or a part of it, and invested
the proceeds, with the ready money left by the testator, the amount of
which was not definitely shown, in real estate, taking the title in her own
name.
The personal property not sold by the widow had long since disappeared-" perished in the using;" but at her death she was possessed
of a personal estate of the value of $1500. The real estate purchased
by her was of the value of $10,000, and that left by the testator $20,000.
(rtwright and Russell, for pkintiff.
Nash, Lasley, and .Myers, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GUTHRIE, J.-Some of the parties having sold and assigned their
interests as heirs at law of Sarah Hall in her estate, the question arising
in the case is, whether she held the title to the real estate purchased
by her, and the personal property which she left, in her own right, or
as trustee for her daughters?
The case has been very fully argued, and if the citations made are
not here specifically referred to, it is because the multitude of the cases
(which, as long ago as 1813, Chief Justice KENT pronounced to be
overwhelming and confounding) renders it impossible.
By the clause of his will above recited, John Hall created three
distinct classes of rights and interests in his personal estate. The use
of it is given to his widow for life, with a limitation over to his daughters. The law is now well settled that, by way of executory bequest,
personal property may be limited over after the determination of a life
interest, in like manner and to the same extent as real estate : Moffat
v. Strong, 10 Johns. 12; Fieldv. Eitchcock, 17 Pick. 122; Rathhone v.
Dyckman et al., 3 Paige 9; Westcott v. Cady, 5 Johns. Ch. 334;
Loring v. Loring, 100 Mass. 340. But in addition to the two estates
or interests thus created, the testator proceeds to charge the whole of
his estate, both real and personal, in the hands of the tenant for life,
with a trust for the benefit of all his children. The language of the
will is clear. The tenant for life has the use of the property "to raise
and school my children with." The case is plainly distinguishable from
that class of cases where the testator, in making a devise, indicates the
general purpose and object of his bounty, but submits the particulars
of time, person, amount, and the like, to the discretion of the first
taker; and also from that class where the language used is merely
expressive of the motive operating on the testator's mind.
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A number of cases of this class are cited in Rich v. Rogers et al., 14
Gray 174. The words "trusting that she will act justly and properly
to and by all our children ;" "at the same time trusting she will from
the love she bears to me and to our dear children, so husband and take
care of what property there may be, for their good ;" "and the residue
and remainder of said dividends to my brother Arthur Benson, to
enable him to assist such of the children of my deceased brother
Francis Benson as he, the said Arthur Benson, shall find deserving of
encouragement ;" ",I give the above devise to my wife, that she may
support herself and her children according to her discretion, and for
that purpose ;" have been held not to create a trust in favor of the
children mentioned in the several cases.
But the words "also the use of all my property for the benefit of
herself and unmarried children, that they may be comfortably provided
for as long as my wife Martha may remain in this life"" with remainder
over to the children, were held to cieate a trust. And in Lorfng v.
Loring et al., by the words, "I give to my wife my personal property
for her benefit and support, and the support of my son, whilst sbhe
remains unmarried ;" it was held the widow took the personal property
in trust during her widowhood, the income of one-half of it to go to
the support of the son. The caso at4ar manifestly belongs to this
latter class. The language employed is substantially the same as that
used in the two cases last cited. The widow is invested with a life
estate, and the devise is immediately followed by words which indicate
not a vague, general, indefinite purpose; but express one that is specific
and determinate. The testator specifically points to his children as the
objects of his bounty; and their education and maintenance during
ininority as what he intended to provide for. Nothing is left to the
discretion of the tenant for life. The use of the property is given "1to
raise and school my children with." Thus both on authority, and by
the unmistakable import of the words, the children are made the beneficiaries of this use, and are invested with' the right to their support
and education out of the income of their father's estate.
Again, the language of the clause is equally as definite as to the estate
for life and remainder over. The words are the same for the realty and
the personalty. The latter is limited to the daughters. The bequest
to the wife is not theproperty in the personal estate, but merely the use
of it during her life. Had the testator contemplated that the absolute
title to the personalty should vest in her, the word "use" could not
have occurred in this connection. A purpose to give property to one
absolutely, is so distinct and variant from a purpose to simply invest
him with a right to use it for a limited time, as render it highly improbable, nay, almost impossible, that one should be mistaken for the other;
or that words should be used which express one, when the other is
intended.
Mrs. Hall, therefore, when she converted the personalty into real
estate, sustained towards it a twofold relation. She was the trustee of
an express trust for the maintenance and education of the children,
and also a tenant for life with remainder to the daughters; she was
trustee of an implied trust : Lewin on Trustees, p. 140, note 1; Id., p.
167, et seg. ; and by taking the title to herself she became the trustee

